UFRN Public Policy professors publish article: Coronavirus and Metropolitan Governance

Raquel Maria da Costa Silveira¹
Lindijane de Souza Bento Almeida²
 Sara Raquel Fernandes Queiroz de Medeiros³
Brunno Costa do Nascimento Silva⁴
Kassinely Souza de Melo⁵
Gabriel Rodrigues da Silva⁶
The fight against coronavirus (COVID-19) in Brazil has highlighted the discussion about the Brazilian federative pact. The multiplicity of measures adopted by federal, state and municipal entities has generated controversy. There are several decrees regulating, restricting and suspending socioeconomic activities. The main social isolation measures came from the states, becoming the target of dissent at the federal level.
After reaching the Federal Supreme Court (STF), a preliminary decision, handed down on April 8 by Minister Alexandre de Moraes, made it possible for states to issue their own rules without the restrictions imposed by state regulations being reversed by the Union. The topic was the subject of an Allegation of Non-compliance with a Fundamental Precept proposed by the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association (ADPF nº 672/DF). The decisions highlighted a federative conflict, having as its objective a fundamental issue in the current scenario: cooperation between entities as an essential and essential instrument for defending the public interest. The STF recalled in the decision: the Separation of Powers and Federalism are established clauses of our Federal Constitution (CF) and, therefore, must function as guides for the exercise of power by governments.
In the same sense, and in judgment on Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI) No. 6341, on April 15, the STF plenary reaffirmed the concurrent competence of federated entities to combat the coronavirus, protecting the Union the possibility of legislating on the subject (just as it did through Provisional Measure No. 926/2020 and Federal Law No. 13,979/2020), as long as it protects the autonomy of states and municipalities.
The judgments cited highlight issues such as Brazilian federalism and the model of division of competences, which, in Brazil, is based on the predominance of interests. Federalism presupposes the autonomy of federative entities and a model for the distribution of legislative, administrative and tax powers – establishing the federative pact. This model is summarized as follows: the federal entity is interested in national defense issues. The states, in turn, must act in matters involving their own territory, reserving to this entity the competences that are not prohibited by the Constitution (remaining competence). Municipalities must act on topics of local interest. It is worth mentioning that, for each sectoral policy, specific regulations will define the limit of each entity's actions, such as common actions in the health area with different attributions defined by Federal Law No. 8,080/1990.
The agreed division of competencies should be capable of generating balance. However, reality shows that this synthesis does not materialize in such an intuitive way, as some topics are limited to the so-called competing legislative competences and common materials.
When we talk about common competencies, we refer to co-responsibilities for acting or implementing policies, meaning the need to act around common themes and cooperation between entities. The competing legislative powers, in turn, involve the Union, states and the Federal District, with the Union being responsible for drawing up general guidelines, not excluding the additional powers of the states, which, given the lack of general rules and legislative action by the Union, will exercise full powers to meet their peculiarities. It is a constitutional norm, explicit and, to date, not very controversial. If the division of competence was, until then, a rule of coexistence, the current crisis has highlighted the conflict in its practice. In this way, the pandemic exposed Brazilian conflicts that were still barely evident.
This is another one of them: among the competing legislative powers, we can mention art. 24, inc. XII of the CF, according to which it is up to the Union, the States and the Federal District to legislate concurrently on health protection and defense. The debate becomes even more complex when the municipality enters the scene. This is because, for example, health care (art. 23, item II of the CF) is a material competence common to the Union, States, Federal District and Municipalities. When it comes to health policy, one must also observe